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Toward a unified Europe?   





Economic development is linked with systematic changes in basic values, but cultural change is 
path dependent. This is known as Inglehart’s thesis. In this paper we build on his thesis and try to 
explain  value  differences  across  European  regions.  This  is  relevant  as  it  fits  in  the  ongoing 
discussion of a ‘Europe of the regions’. We find confirmation of Inglehart’s thesis. New however, 
is our finding that historical shocks like the collapse of the Soviet Union marking the ‘end of 
history’ can influence this path dependent process. Moreover, we illustrate that convergence of 
values  into  a  ‘single  European  value  landscape’  takes  a  very  long  period,  if  it  would  occur 
anyway. 
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1. Introduction and background 
 
In March 1957 six nations signed the historic Treaty of Rome, setting in motion the economic 
and political integration of Western Europe. The infant European Community had from the start 
an overriding priority to unite countries previously at war and in doing so lay the basis of a 
European  union.  But,  besides  this  ‘superior’  political  goal,  the  actual  agenda  was  essentially 
concerned  with  more  routine  policy  issues  like  trade,  agriculture,  coals  and  steel  (Albrechts, 
1995). The Treaty of Rome envisaged an integrated market for the free movements of goods, 
capital,  labour  and  services,  also  known  as  the  ‘four  freedoms’.  The  process  of  economic 
integration  resulted  in  the  adoption  of  the  Single  European  Act,  implying  that  the  Heads  of 
Governments of - by then - the twelve member states committed themselves to complete the 
internal market by the end of 1992.  
The increased European integration is altering the architecture of the Western European 
state.  Regions  are  no  longer  confined  to  national  borders  but  increasingly  have  become  an 
element in European politics. Keating (1998) argues that this erosion of the boundary between 
domestic  and  international  politics  is  due  to  the  increased  interdependencies  among  policy 
spheres. This transforms the state-centered politics in the increasingly unified Europe. But also 
Ohmae in his ‘End of the Nation State’ claimed that functional imperatives at the global level are 
breaking down nation states in favour of regional entities (Ohmae, 1995). All in all, the process 
of European integration has resulted in blurring boundaries of the state. And the completion of 
the  internal  market  has  further  triggered  this  increased  European  regionalism.  In  fact,  the 
European Commission even formulated a vision of a so-called ‘Europe of the Regions’ in which 
there  would  be  a  reasonable  homogeneous  regional  social-economic  structure  across  Europe. 
This vision of a ‘Europe of the regions’ is attractive, because it (admittedly vaguely) refers to a 
Europe that is ‘geographically decentralised, economically competitive, politically pluralist, with 
a refreshed democratic life that draws upon diverse provincial and national identities’ (Garside 
and Hebbert, 1989, in: Newlands, 1995).  
But this regionalism in Europe is not new. Regions and regionalism have a long history in 
Europe. Regions predated the rise of the nation state and shaped the  emergence of the state 
system. In some countries more than in other, regions constituted an obstacle to centralized state 
and nation building, and remained as  an element in the politics of states. Before the rise of   4 
modern nation-state Europe was a highly differentiated political order. Power was fragmented 
territorially, among empires, kingdoms, principalities, cities as well as functionally among the 
political, religious and economic spheres. Germany, for example only unified into a single state 
in 1871. As a result of global processes and European integration in specific, regions are again 
featuring  political,  social  and  economic  life.  Hence,  the  recent  enthusiasm  in  regions  and 
regionalism that had its peak in the middle of the 1990s is not new. Arguing so would ignore the 
historical role of regions in Europe.  
Regional identity is a key element in the construction of regions as social and political 
spaces and systems of action. One measure of regional specificity is provided by the existence of 
different values, norms and behaviour among regions within the same nation state. The most 
common sources of such values and patterns of social communication are religion and language 
(Keating,  1998).    ‘In  general  these  follow  state  boundaries,  since  following  the  Reformation 
states determined the religious affiliation of their citizens, while state-imposed language policies 
were a force for national integration from the nineteenth-century, and in some cases earlier. Yet 
in  some  cases,  notably  Germany,  the  state  was  formed  after  the  Reformation,  and  religious 
divisions became identified with regions within it’ (Keating, 1998, p. 85). 
Nevertheless, one of the driving forces behind the ‘new’ regionalism is provided by the 
economic  restructuring  and  rapid  changes  in  modes  of  production  from  the  Fordist  mode  of 
production  (large  scale,  standardized  units  for  national  markets)  to  post-Fordism  (flexible 
production, small units). Though there are differences between territories and sectors, it can be 
argued that the geography of production has changed (Piore and Sabel, 1984). Some territorially 
based factors are becoming less important, enhancing the freedom of firms to choose locations, 
but many of the new critical factors are themselves territorial. Hence, at the time of globalisation, 
there is a resurgence of regional economies. 
  In this paper  we study  the cultural aspects of the ‘Europe of the regions’. We try to 
explain value differences in European regions. In explaining value differences between regions 
we  build  on  Inglehart,  who  has  described  and  empirically  analysed  the  relationship  between 
cultural  values  and  economic  development  (1990,  1997,  2000).  Inglehart  has  shown  that 
economic  development  is  linked  with  systematic  changes  in  basic  values.  Inglehart’s  main 
argument is that economic development has a number of systematic and predictable cultural and 
political consequences (ibid.). However, Inglehart shows that cultural change does not follow a   5 
linear path, but in fact has two dimensions. The first relates to early industrialization and the rise 
of the working class. The second dimension reflects the value changes that are linked to the 
affluent conditions of advanced industrial society and the rise of the service sector. In addition to 
these findings, Inglehart and Baker find evidence for the persistence of distinctive traditional 
values and conclude that cultural change may be path-dependent. 
The explanation of value differences is particularly interesting against the background of 
a unifying Europe and the idea of a ‘Europe of the regions’. The question we try to answer in this 
paper is if we can speak of cultural unification in Europe. And in case of cultural differences 
across European regions, the question arises if we can explain these value differences? And can 
we say something on the possible convergence of values across Europe?  
The outline of the paper is as follows. In the next section we describe Inglehart’s thesis, 
which is central to our further analyses. Then we describe the measurement of the two basic 
cultural dimensions as developed by Inglehart. After that we show that regions in Europe differ 
considerably on these two basic dimensions and we shed some light on the general direction of 
value change in time. Then we use regression analysis in order to try to explain value differences 
across European regions. Before jumping to the concluding section we build on our regression 
results and perform an experiment by means we aim to shed light on the question if there is value 
convergence across European regions.  
 
2. Inglehart’s thesis: economic development ànd path-dependency 
 
Before describing Inglehart’s thesis on the relation between culture and economic development, 
we need to define culture. The term culture has a multiplicity of meanings. Narrowly understood 
it refers to the arts and entertainment, whether upscale or popular (cf. Van de Ploeg, 2002). More 
generally, it can be understood as the perceptual frames, values and norms used in social life: as a 
way society looks at itself and as a filter of what it sees. The two are connected, in that arts and 
entertainment provide symbols of identity and representations of social norms as providing a 
more or less distorting mirror to society. But even generally understood, numerous definitions of 
culture exist, and most include elements like meanings, values and religion or ideology. One of 
the most accepted and extensive definitions is the one proposed by Clifford Geertz. He defines 
culture as ‘an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of   6 
inherited  conceptions  expressed  in  symbolic  forms  by  means  of  which  men  communicate, 
perpetuate,  and  develop  their  own  knowledge  about  and  attitudes  toward  life’  (1973,  p.  89). 
Hofstede’s  definition  is  in  a  way  a  summary  of  Geertz,  as  Hofstede  defines  culture  as  the 
‘collective programming of the mind’ (Hofstede, 2001, p. 1). Hofstede adds that culture does not 
only manifests itself in values but also in more superficial ways, in symbols, heroes and rituals 
(ibid.). A central element in most definitions of culture is the concept of values
1. Similar to 
culture, numerous definitions exist but here we follow Hofstede (2001). Building on a large body 
of literature he defines a value as a ‘broad tendency to prefer certain states of affairs over others’ 
(Hofstede, 2001, p. 5). 
In  numerous  publications  Inglehart  has  described  and  empirically  analysed  the 
relationship between cultural values and economic development (1990, 1997, 2000). He writes 
that ‘in marked contrast to the growing materialism linked with the industrial revolution, the 
unprecedented existential security of advanced industrial society gave rise to an intergenerational 
shift  towards  postmaterialist  and  postmodernist  values’  (Inglehart  and  Baker,  2000,  p.  21). 
Industrialisation is linked with an emphasis on economic growth at almost any price, whereas in 
affluent societies elements like the quality of life, environmental protection and self-expression 
are emphasized. As Bell (1973) writes, industrialisation brought less dependence on nature and 
the world became mechanical, bureaucratic and rationalized. The rise of the service economy 
coincides  with  the  reduced  emphasis  on  material  objects  and  a  growing  emphasis  on  self-
expression (Inglehart, 1997). In sum, the shift from industrial to service economies goes together 
with a shift in value priorities from an emphasis on economic and physical security toward an 
increasing emphasis on subjective well-being and quality of life. 
Inglehart’s  central  thesis  is  that  economic  development  has  systematic,  and  to  some 
extent,  predictable  cultural  and  political  consequences.  According  to  Inglehart  these 
consequences are not iron laws of history, but probabilistic trends. In other words, the probability 
is high that certain changes will occur as societies economically develop, but also depends on the 
specific cultural and historical context of the society in question. 
Inglehart’s  thesis  differs  from  traditional  modernization  theorists,  who  argue  that  the 
decline of ‘traditional’ values and their replacement with ‘modern’ values occurs as a result of 
                                                 
1 For an excellent overview of definitions of ‘culture’ and ‘values’ we refer to Chapter 1 ‘Values and Culture’ of 
Hofstede’s 2001 revised second edition of Culture’s Consequences.   7 
economic  and  political  forces.  Modernization  theory  heavily  borrowed  from  Marxism  as  it 
essentially has an economic view of the underlying forces of historical change. The dialectical 
process of historical evolution should be reasonably similar for different human societies and 
cultures. As Marx has stated in the preface of the English edition of Das Kapital ‘the country that 
is more developed industrially only shows, to the less developed, the image of its own future’. In 
other words, this modernization school predicts the convergence of values. But as Fukuyama 
(1992) writes, modernization theory is somehow not satisfying. It is a theory that works to the 
extent that man is an economic creature, to the extent that he is driven by the imperatives of 
economic  growth  and  industrial  rationality.  Its  undeniable  power  derives  from  the  fact  that 
human beings, particularly in the aggregate, do in fact act out of such motives for much of their 
lives. But there are other aspects of human motivation that have nothing to do with economics, 
and  it  is  here  that  discontinuities  in  history  find  their  origin  (Fukuyama,  1992,  p. 133-134). 
Nevertheless, modernization theory looks much more persuasive after 1990 than it did in the 
1960s  or  1970s  when  it  came  under  heavy  attack  in  academic  circles  (Fukuyama,  1992). 
Especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union modernization theorists would argue that almost 
all countries that have succeeded in achieving a high level of economic development have come 
to look increasingly similar to each other. Modernization theory eventually fell victim to the 
accusation that it was ethnocentric, i.e. it elevated the western European and North-American 
development experience to the level of universal truth, without recognizing its culture bounded-
ness.  The  critique  focused  on  the  idea  in  modernization  theory  that  the  western  model  was 
supposedly the only valid one.  
However, Inglehart’s thesis also differs from the competing school, which emphasizes the 
persistence of values despite economic and political changes. More precisely, this second school 
‘predicts that convergence around some set of ‘modern’ values is unlikely and that ‘traditional’ 
values  will  continue  to  exert  an  independent  influence  on  the  cultural  changes  caused  by 
economic development’ (Inglehart and Baker, 2000, p. 20). Though this second school of thought 
has  been  criticized  for  its  cultural  determinism,  it  has  become  quite  popular  to  take  cultural 
differences as independent and stable entities in explaining the process and speed of (economic) 
development. The extensive discussion on social capital clearly shows the current popularity of 
this type of thinking in sociology and especially economics (Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam, 1993, 
Knack and Keefer, 1997, Zak and Knack, 2001).   8 
Inglehart and Baker (2000) show that it is in fact the combination of these two schools 
that  does  most  justice  to  the  complex  reality  of  value  changes  around  different  societies. 
Modernization theorists are therefore partly right. The rise of industrial society is linked with 
coherent  cultural  shifts  away  from  traditional  value  systems,  and  the  rise  of  a  postindustrial 
society  is  linked  with  a  shift  away  from  absolute  norms  and  values  towards  a  syndrome  of 
increasingly rational, tolerant, trusting postindustrial societies. But values are path-dependent, 
which fits the second school. Inglehart and Baker show that a history of Protestant or Orthodox or 
Islamic  traditions  gives  rise  to  cultural  zones  that  persist  after  controlling  for  the  effects  of 
economic development. This leads Inglehart and Baker to conclude that ‘economic development 
tends to push societies in a common direction, but rather than converging, they seem to move on 
parallel trajectories shaped by their cultural heritages’ (Inglehart and Baker, 2000, p. 49). In their 
view, culture should not be seen in an essentialist or reductionist manner, as something which is 
inherent  to  a  society  or  which  condemns  it  to  path  dependency,  but  as  something  which  is 
continuously created and recreated (c.f. Keating, 1998). Therefore, economic development brings 
cultural changes, but the fact that a society was shaped by for example Protestantism leaves a 
permanent imprint and has enduring effects on subsequent value development.  
In their path-breaking analysis Inglehart and Baker use two basic dimensions to measure 
cultural differences around the globe. Evidently there are several ways to measure the character 
of societies (e.g Hofstede, 2001). But having studied dozens of items and variables, Inglehart 
argues that two dimensions tap the basic cultural orientations of societies when comparing the 
worldviews of the peoples of rich societies with those of low-income societies across a wide 
range of political, social, and religious norms and beliefs. Inglehart labels these dimensions the 
Traditional/rational  dimension  and  the  Survival/self-expression  dimension.  The  first 
Traditional/rational dimension reflects a value system in which people at the traditional pole of 
this dimension reject divorce, emphasize the importance of God, support deference to authority, 
seldom discuss politics and have high levels of national pride (Inglehart and Baker, 2000). At the 
rational pole of this dimension opposite values are emphasized.  
The  second  dimension  Survival/self-expression  taps  values  that  emerge  in  a  post-
industrial society with high levels of security. According to Inglehart, a central component of this 
dimension  involves  the  difference  between  materialist  and  post-materialist  values.  This   9 
component measures the relative priority that is given to economic and physical security over 
self-expression and quality of life.  
 
 
2.1. Measuring values 
 
As described in the previous section, Inglehart measures culture along two basic dimensions. Our 
measurement of the cultural dimensions in European regions follows Inglehart. Data are taken 
from the European Value Studies (EVS), which is a unique dataset on norms and values. This 
survey was developed in the 1970s against the background of changing values and an increased 
interest  in  the  cultural  consequences  of  the  unification  process  of  the  European  Union.  The 
survey comprises three waves (1981/1990/1999), of which we use the second and third. In order 
to obtain regional scores we had to regroup the original individual data. We did not use the first 
wave that was carried out in 1981, because we could not trace the individual scores in terms of 
regions. 
The  dataset  comprises  8  countries,  i.e.  France,  Italy,  Germany,  Spain,  Portugal,  The 
Netherlands, Belgium, and the United Kingdom. In order to compare the data on norms and 
values with regional economic data we used the Eurostat definition of regions. The regional level 
in our analyses is the  NUTS1 level. This implies that France consists of 8 regions,  Italy 11 
(including Sicily and Sardinia), Germany 11 (former eastern regions excluded), Spain 7, Portugal 
1 (excluding Acoren and Madeira), The Netherlands 4, Belgium 3, and the UK 10 (including 
Scotland,  excluding  Northern  Ireland).  The  total  number  of  regions  equals  55.  We  have 
calculated the two dimensions for these 55 regions in 1990 and 1999.  
In table 1 we summarise the items that are included in our two dimensions. Inglehart and 
Baker (2000) extensively discuss the correlation of other items that are included in the European 
Values  Study  but  not  included  in  the  dimensions  in  table  1
2.  Their  conclusion  is  that  the 
                                                 
2 It is important to note that there is a difference between the World Values Survey (WVS), used by Inglehart and the 
European Values Studies (EVS) used by us. The European Values Study is a large-scale, cross-national, and 
longitudinal survey research program on basic human values, initiated by the European Value Systems Study Group 
(EVSSG) in the late 1970s, at that time an informal grouping of academics. Now, it is carried on in the setting of a 
foundation, using the (abbreviated) name of the group European Values Study (EVS). In 1995-1997 the World 
Values Survey carried out a wave of research in a large number of Western and non-Western countries. They aim at 
a better coverage of non-Western societies and analysing the development of a democratic political culture in the 
emerging Third Wave democracies.  It should be mentioned that the majority of the survey questions in WVS and   10 
dimensions  as  defined  tap  a  broad  dimension  of  cross-cultural  variation  involving  dozens  of 
additional  variables.  The  two  dimensions  therefore  reflect  basic  cultural  characteristics  of  a 
society. 
 
<Insert table 1 about here> 
 
 
Based on the above items we calculated the two dimensions for each region in each year for 
which we have data, i.e. 1990 and 1999. The results for each region are shown in table 2. The 
first column depicts the Traditional/rational dimension for the 55 European regions in 1990. The 
second column measures the second Surviva/self-expression dimension in the same year. The 
third  column  measures  the  Traditional/rational  dimension  in  1999,  and  the  fourth  column 
measures the Survival/self-expression dimension in the last year for which we have observations. 
It  should  be  noted  that  the  values  for  the  UK  on  this  second  dimension  in  1999  cannot  be 
measured properly. The reason for this is that in the UK an additional item was included in the 
question  that  aims  to  measure  the  opinion  of  the  respondent  regarding  his  or  her  priority  to 
economic and physical security over self-expression and quality of life. This inclusion of an 
additional  item  in  the  UK-survey  makes  it  impossible  to  calculate  the  right  score  on  this 
dimension.  
 
<Insert table 2 about here> 
                                                                                                                                                              
EVS are similar. Currently there are initiatives to merge the two datasets, allowing researchers to study more 
countries in a longer period of time.   11 
 
As table 2 shows, the values differ considerably across regions. Calculations on country level 
show that the northern European countries tend to score higher on both dimensions (see also 
Inglehart and Baker, 2000). The only northern European countries in this sample are Germany 
and The Netherlands. Though both countries score relatively high on both dimensions, Germany 
scores higher on the Traditional/rational dimension, and the Netherlands score relatively high on 
the Survival/self-expression dimension. A graphical representation of the scores of the European 
regions is presented below, as well for the 1990 scores and the 1999 scores.  
 
<Insert figure 1 and 2 about here> 
 
As becomes clear from the graphical representation in figures 1 and 2 and the data in table 2, the 
southern European regions score lower on both dimensions compared to the northern European 
regions. As modernization theory predicts this probably is due to welfare differences.   
 
2.2. The general direction of value change 
 
In order to answer the question if there exists a general direction of value change over time, we 
follow Inglehart and Baker and compare the two scores for each region in time. Inglehart and 
Baker describe the time span for 38 societies between 1981 and 1998. Our data on European 
regions can only be compared in time between an even shorter period 1990-1999, i.e. ten years. 
In table 2 we have described the direction of value change in the fifth column. As Inglehart and 
Baker  made  clear  the  expected  general  pattern  is  not  random  but  one  of  value  change  in 
northeastern direction, implying that countries (or in our case regions) experience increasingly 
rational  and  well-being  values.  As  extensively  described  in  their  article,  the  majority  of  the 
countries shifted to the upper right-hand corner in the Figures, and those countries that did not 
(e.g. the countries belonging to the former Soviet Union) experienced economic decline. This fits 
the general thesis of Inglehart and Baker that economic development promotes rational and self-
expression values, while economic collapse will push in the opposite direction. Their findings 
suggest that ‘rising security tends to produce a shift towards secular rational values and tolerance, 
trust, subjective well-being, and a post-modernist outlook, while social and economic collapse   12 
propel a society in the opposite direction’ (Inglehart and Baker, 2000, p. 42). As we do not have 
regions that have experienced economic decline in this period we might expect that all, or at least 
the majority of the regions have experienced a shift from the south-west into the north-eastern 
direction. In the fifth column of table 2 we have described the direction of change by wind–
direction. It shows that the majority of the regions have experienced a shift upwards in their score 
on both the Traditional/rational dimension as well as the Survival/self-expression dimension. In 
sum, about 17 of the 45 regions experience a value change in north-eastern (NE) direction which 
fits the Inglehart-Baker (2000) thesis and is according to our expectations; 7 regions shift in 
northern (N) direction, 5 in eastern (E) direction, 2 in southern (S), 3 in south western (SW), 2 in 
north western (NW), 6 in south eastern (SE) and 3 do not go in any direction. As mentioned 
earlier, data problems for the UK result in unobserved values for the second dimension in 1999, 
which  makes  it  impossible  to  describe  the  value  change  in  UK-regions.  Though  we  have  a 
different  sample  and  observe  a  relatively  short  period  of  analysis  (only  ten  years)  we  find 
confirmation of the Inglehart and Baker thesis on value change. In the next section we build on 
this thesis and focus on the explanation of value differences between European regions. 
   13 
3. Explaining value differences in Europe 
 
As  described  above,  Inglehart’s  thesis  is  that  value  differences  can  be  explained  both  by 
differences in welfare levels as well as cultural heritage. In order to test simultaneously for the 
influence of economic development and specific cultural heritage we follow their analysis and 
perform a regression analysis. The unit of analysis are European regions. Table 3 summarises our 
regression results of cross-regional differences in Traditional/rational values and Survival/self-
expression values as measured in 55 European regions. We have calculated the dimensions in two 
periods,  1990  and  1999.  The  number  of  panel  observations  is  therefore  110.  The  level  of 
economic development has been measured by Gross Regional Products (GRP) and is based on 
Eurostat  information.  Following  Inglehart  and  Baker  (2000)  we  use  data  on  economic 
development preceding the years for which we want to explain cultural differences. The years we 
use  for  the  two  time  periods  are  1977,  respectively  1990.  In  order  to  test  if  these  years  are 
possible biases in terms of GRP, we also tested the correlation with the 5-year average in which 
the two chosen years fall in between. As the correlation was over .99 we feel safe to claim that a 
bias in measurement of level of economic development is not to be expected.  
Next  to  GDP  per  capita  Inglehart  and  Baker  include  the  percentage  employed  in  the 
industrial  or  the  service  sector  as  measures  of  economic  development.  However,  we  choose 
explicitly not to do so as we think that the combination of these variables in the same regression 
analysis is not correct from an economic and subsequently a statistical point of view. The reason 
is the following. Economic theory and empirical studies have shown that there is a fundamental 
relationship between the development of GDP per capita and sectoral development of a country. 
Feinstein (1999) and Rowthorn and Ramaswamy (1997, 1999) show that all advanced countries, 
irrespective of their initial level of development, have experienced the process in which labour 
moved out of agriculture and into industry, and was followed by a second phase in which the 
dominant trend was the growth of the services at the expense of both industry and agriculture. 
There is a basic pattern among the process of structural change in many countries. Economic 
growth  induces  structural  change.  Chenery  (1960)  has  studied  these  ‘stylized  facts  of 
development’ in a more quantitative way
3. Using regression analysis he explains the sectoral 
                                                 
3 The discussion on the causes of structural change is extensive. Especially in the fifties and sixties of the 20
th 
century researchers have been involved in this field of study. Authors like Fourastié (1949), Clark (1957), Chenery 
(1960), Rostow (1960) and Kuznets (1971) have made influential contributions.   14 
share by the level of GDP per capita. Chenery introduces the term normal pattern or development 
path to describe the relationship between sectoral share and level of welfare (Chenery, 1960). 
Inglehart and Baker link the Traditional/rational dimension with the process of industrialization. 
The  rise  of  the  service  economy  is  linked  to  the  Survival/self-expression  dimension.  But  if 
economic  growth  is  fundamentally  connected  with  the  change  in  sectoral  structure,  i.e.  as  a 
country becomes richer, it experiences a sectoral shift from the agrarian sector to the industrial 
sector and the service sector, then Inglehart and Baker’s regression analysis in which both GDP 
per capita and sectoral shares are included might suffer from endogeneity. Therefore we only 
include GRP per capita as our measure of economic development. 
With  respect  to  cultural  heritage  we  follow  Inglehart  and  Baker  (2000)  and  measure 
cultural heritage by including a dummy for religious past. In the European case this choice is 
binomial, namely protestant or catholic
4. We labelled the UK and the northern German and Dutch 
regions as protestant. The dummy takes the value 1 if a region has a protestant heritage.  
In addition to Inglehart and Baker we also included a period-specific effect. The panel 
allows us to test if there is perhaps a period-specific effect that has influenced the development of 
values.  The  period-specific  dummy  takes  the  value  1  in  the  second  period  (t=2).  Hence,  a 
negative coefficient of the period-specific effect would imply that a downward correction on the 
dependent variable is needed in the second period, which is the 1990s.  
We test two basic models for each of the two dimensions. In the second model we control 
for country-specific effects. We do so to test if the results with respect to economic development, 
cultural heritage  and the period-specific effect are robust to the inclusion of country-specific 
characteristics. We have taken a large European country Germany as the country of reference. 
This means that a significant positive country-specific effect of for example Spain would imply 
that an upward correction is needed for Spain compared to Germany for the specific dependent 
variable. The results of the regression are shown in table 3. 
 
<Insert table 3 about here> 
 
                                                 
4 Though we admit that for example the southern regions of Spain have been under Islamic influence before the 14
th  
century. Nevertheless it is clear that Catholicism shaped Spain in the subsequent centuries.   15 
Modernization theory holds that the process of economic development is conducive to a rational 
worldview. Our results show that the economic modernization indicator, GRP is positive and 
significant in all models. As explained earlier we explicitly choose not to include the size of the 
industrial and service sector. In this respect our analysis differs from the one of Inglehart and 
Baker (2000). Still, as expected the level of economic development is an important explanatory 
variable  when  explaining  differences  in  value  systems.  Both  on  the  Traditional/rational 
dimension  and  the  Survival/self-expression  dimension  GRP  per  capita  has  a  significant  and 
positive effect.  
Our measure of cultural heritage, the religious past of a region, is significantly related to 
the differences in values across European regions. In line with the results of Inglehart and Baker 
(2000), a protestant heritage is positively related to both cultural dimensions. In fact, the effect 
size of .035 in the regression with the first dimension and especially the effect size of .084 in the 
second dimension indicate that the effect of cultural heritage is relatively large compared to the 
average  value  of  the  two  dimensions  (.20/.22  respectively  .13)  as  depicted  in  table  2. 
Nevertheless,  the  protestant  dummy  is  not  significant  once  we  control  for  country-specific 
effects.  This  suggest  that  Inglehart  and  Baker  are  right  when  arguing  that  ‘given  religious 
traditions have historically shaped the national culture of given societies, but that today their 
impact is transmitted through nationwide institutions, to the population of that society as a whole 
– even to those who have little or no contact with religious institutions’ (Inglehart and Baker, 
2000, p. 36). Indeed, our results suggest that the regional differences within Germany and The 
Netherlands in terms of protestant or catholic tradition are not so strong to significantly differ 
from national characteristics once we control for the latter. In other words, although historically 
catholic  or  protestant  regions  show  distinctive  values,  the  differences  within  given  societies 
(countries)  are  relatively  small.  Catholics  tend  to  score  lower  on  the  two  dimensions  than 
protestants, but they do not fall into a distinct catholic cultural zone when controlling for country-
specific characteristics. To put it rather bluntly, Catholics in ‘mixed’ countries are ‘less catholic’ 
than Catholics from countries that only have a single religion that is present. 
Without discussing each country-specific effect individually, the results correspond with 
the  structure  of  the  data  as  presented  in  the  figures  1  and  2.  Remember  that  the  country  of 
reference is Germany. As can be seen in figures 1 and 2, German regions score relatively high on 
the first dimension Traditional/rational. Using Germany as a country of reference, this implies   16 
that for most countries a downward correction is needed. The results in the third column of the 
regression  analysis  confirm  this  hypothesis;  all  countries  except  for  The  Netherlands  have  a 
significant and negative estimated country-specific effect. This downward correction is relatively 
large for the Traditional/rational dimension if we compare the effect size of the country-specific 
dummies  (between  -.08  for  France  and  -.19  for  Italy)  with  the  average  value  of  the 
Traditional/rational dimension (.20 in 1990 and .22 in 1999). A similar reasoning holds for the 
regression analysis on the second dimension measuring Survival/self-expression. Figure 1 and 2 
clearly  show  that  The  Netherlands  score  relatively  high  on  this  second  dimension.  Using 
Germany as a country of reference, a strong positive country-specific effect for The Netherlands 
can be expected. The estimated coefficient of .18 for The Netherlands is in line with the above. 
The period-specific effect taking the value 1 on t=2 is significant in the models explaining 
cross-regional differences on the second dimension, i.e. Survival/self-expression. The significant 
result  implies  that  a  correction  is  needed  in  the  1990s  compared  to  the  period  before  when 
explaining  the  variation  in  the  Survival/self-expression  dimension.  The  positive  coefficient 
suggests an upward correction is needed for the period 1990s. This period-specific effect is .032 
in the model without country-specific effects and .024 in the model with the country-specific 
effects. In terms of effect size this is relatively large compared to the average score of 0.13 on the 
Survival/self-expression dimension (see table 2). The question arises how we can explain this 
1990s effect? Our results indicate that apparently Europeans have experienced some kind of a 
shock in the 1990s, which changed their value pattern in the direction of more post-modern 
values. One of the most important historical shocks has been the collapse of the Soviet Union in 
1991.  
As Fukuyama clearly described in The End of History (1992) a remarkable consensus 
emerged concerning the legitimacy of liberal democracy, as a system of government had emerged 
throughout the world in the late 1980s and beginning 1990s. Liberal democracy conquered rival 
ideologies like hereditary monarchy, fascism and more important and most recent communism. 
Fukuyama argued that liberal democracy may constitute the ‘end point of mankind’s ideological 
evolution’ and ‘the final form of human government’ and as such constituted ‘the end of history’. 
According to Fukuyama, liberal democracy has come out as the ‘winner’ as it is does not contain   17 
internal  contradictions
5.  This  confirmation  of  the  –  implicitly  -  western  European  model  has 
influenced the general opinion of people living in these and former communist countries as well.  
As Fukuyama writes, ‘the collapse of Marxist ideology in the late 1980s reflected, in a sense, the 
achievement of a higher level of rationality on the part of those who lived in such societies, and 
their realization that rational universal recognition could be had only in a liberal social order’ 
(Fukuyama,  1992,  p.  205).  In  other  words,  the  collapse  of  the  Soviet  Union,  and  the 
corresponding ‘triumph’ of the capitalist system have resulted in an increase in liberal market 
thinking in the 1990s. This is not only analysed in Fukuyama’s book, but also anecdotal evidence 
like the deregulation and privatisation wave that took place in many western European countries 
can be seen as illustrations of this upsurge in liberal market thinking. However, this economic 
thinking has gone hand in hand with a change in value patterns of Europeans in the direction of 
post-modernism, i.e. our second dimension of culture.  
In addition to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent ‘confirmation’ of the 
capitalist liberal democratic model, two other societal developments may have resulted in this 
period-specific (shock) effect in the explanation of value change. First, the 1990s have been a 
period in Europe where the unification process reached a peak with the (future prospect of the) 
introduction of the Euro. The 1990s, especially the second half of the 1990s, have been a period 
in which there was a broadly shared optimistic view on the future. The introduction of the single 
European currency was supposed to yield welfare advantages that caused this optimistic view of 
future developments. The other societal development is closely related to this. By the time the 
survey was held, 1999, the New Economy hype was on its peak. There was a broadly shared idea 
among  many  people  living  in  western  countries  that  the  New  Economy  would  yield  endless 
welfare gains and periods of economic downturn were (mistakenly) assumed to be non-existent 
and irrelevant. It can be expected that this has influenced the answers that respondents have given 
to  the  survey  questions  and  might  help  explain  the  positive  period-specific  effect  on  the 
Survival/self-expression dimension.  
To conclude, our regression analysis shows that economic development is an important 
driver  of  value  change,  but  there  are  persistent  influences  of  cultural  heritage  measured  by 
protestant or catholic historical tradition. This is a confirmation of Inglehart’s thesis. Moreover, 
                                                 
5 Though it should be noted that Fukuyama devotes considerable attention in his book to argue that there are several 
problems with liberal democracy too. It is not to say that stable democracies are not without injustice or serious 
social problems, but the ideal of liberal democracy could according to Fukuyama not be improved upon.   18 
we found that Europeans have experienced some shock in terms of the Surivival/self-expression 
dimension in the 1990s. Most probably the collapse of the Soviet Union and - according to some 
- the ultimate proof of the success of the capitalist democratic model are causes for this upward 
shock effect on values of Europeans.  
 
4. Value convergence 
 
Now that we have measured values of Europeans, shed light on the general direction of value 
change,  and  made  an  effort  to  explain  cross-regional  variation  in  values  we  turn  to  the 
implications of our study. Our results suggest that economic development is an important ‘driver’ 
of value change, but that there are persistent influences of cultural heritage. The question can be 
asked what the above means in terms of value convergence. In other words, the question is if - in 
a unifying Europe in the economic and political sense - we can say something about cultural 
homogeneity and value convergence in Europe?  
In  order  to  answer  this  question  and  illustrate  our  findings  we  do  an  experiment.  As 
figures 1 and 2 show, the eastern Netherlands’ region (NL2) scores relatively high on the second 
dimension Survival/self-expression and the German region Rheinland-Pfalz (DEB) scores high on 
the  Traditional/rational  dimension.  Both  regions  are  -  logically  given  our  findings  -  also 
relatively prosperous. It can also be seen that continental Portugal (PT1) and the southern Italian 
region Campania (IT8) score low on both dimensions. These latter regions are also relatively 
poor. We undertake the following experiment: by allowing for economic growth differentials and 
catch-up growth of the two poorer regions we calculate the scores on both dimensions for the 4 
regions  mentioned  above  in  2020.  By  catch-up  growth  we  mean  that  we  follow  traditional 
convergence theory and allow poorer regions to grow faster than richer regions. We do so by 
assuming that the richer German and Dutch regions grow by 1 %. The poorer regions in Southern 
Italy and Portugal are assumed to have completely converged within 20 years to the welfare level 
of the Netherlands’ region (NL2)
6. Hence, we do not allow for a rather unrealistic leapfrogging 
process in which the poorer regions outgrow the richer regions in level of welfare. Given the end 
                                                 
6 Given the predicted level of welfare in the Dutch region based on the 1% growth and the initial levels of welfare in 
the southern European regions IT8 and PT1 straightforward calculation shows that the average GRP per capita 
growth in the Italian region is equal to 2.1 % and the Portugese region grows on average by 2.8% in the period of 
analysis.   19 
year of 2020, we consider a 20-year growth period. We then impute this new GDP per capita 
value in the regression equation we estimated in table 4. Using our estimated coefficients we 
calculate the estimated value of the Traditional/rational and Survival/self-expression dimensions 
in 2020. In the top part of table 4 we have calculated the scores based on the model excluding the 
country dummies. The bottom part summarizes the results when the country-specific effects are 
included. 
 
<Insert table 4 about here> 
 
The  experiment  with  the  twenty-year  period  and  the  assumption  on  growth  differentials  is 
expected to imply that both Campania and Portugal converge to some extent to the values of 
people living in Rheinland-Pfalz and Eastern Netherlands. In line with our earlier findings, the 
scores for all regions on all dimensions are higher than those for 1999, which fits the idea of 
value-change in northeastern direction. Nevertheless, as well in the model with country-specific 
effects as the model without country-specific effects, there is a considerable gap between the 
Portugese and Italian values on the one hand and the German and Dutch regions on the other 
hand. Given the higher explained variance in the model including country-specific effects we 
prefer the estimates of the lower part of table 4. These predicted scores clearly show that the 
Italian and Portugese regions remain relatively ‘backward’ compared to the value development in 
the two northern European regions. In fact, even allowing for significant catch-up growth both 
southern regions do not even reach the score in 2020 that the eastern Netherlands obtained in 
1999. The broad picture that emerges is one of the existence of value differences even when 
allowing for rather strong welfare development in the ‘backward’ regions. 
Evidently,  the  calculation  and  the  above  conclusion  are  built  on  some  important 
assumptions. In other words, these scores are ceteris paribus, i.e. independent of possible future 
shocks that may turn out to have important historical meaning, like the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. But more important, it assumes a 1.1 % respectively 1.8 % growth differential between 
regions for 20 years (starting in 1990), which is a significant percentage. It can be questioned if 
this  is  realistic.  Long–run  regional  economic  data  for  European  regions  that  are  reliable  and 
comparable  are  not  available.  However,  on  country  level,  Maddison  provides  long  run  data 
(Maddison, 2001). From his analysis it becomes clear that such a growth differential for such a   20 
long period of time is not realistic. For the European countries Maddison has calculated growth 
rates of GDP per capita between 1950-1973 and 1973-1998. Table 5 summarizes some of his 
findings for the countries in our sample. This gives some feeling for the unrealistic assumption 
we made regarding the growth differentials
7. 
 
<Insert table 5 about here> 
 
 
Finally, we do not assume that there are ‘decreasing marginal returns to value development’, i.e. 
the linear connection between economic development and value systems does not flatten
8. In 
sum, our experiment shows that it takes a long period (and perhaps even unrealistic assumptions) 
to allow for limited value convergence in Europe.  
The preceding discussion illustrates that the vision of the European Commission of a 
broadly shared European value system is not built on realistic accounts of the actual cultural 
differences that exist in Europe. It can be expected that this ‘European value landscape’ becomes 
even more diverse when the current plans for EU enlargement take place. In order to shed some 
light on the the potential consequences of the future enlargement of the European Union with 
Middle and Eastern European countries we calculated the scores for the two cultural dimensions 
in 1999. The countries that are on the list of EU enlargement by January 2004 and for which we 
have data in the 1999 wave are shown in table 6.  
 
<Insert table 6 about here> 
 
Filling in these value points in the figures 1 and 2 leads to the conclusion that the majority of 
these  countries  (perhaps  excluding  the  Czech  Republic  and  Slovenia)  falls  in  the  south-west 
corner of the two axes representing the two cultural dimensions. This implies that the majority of 
the  countries  that  are  on  the  list  for  potential  membership  of  the  European  Union  differ 
                                                 
7 Note that the relatively high growth rates in these countries in the period 1950-1973 are mainly due to post-war 
catch up growth. This process is generally considered to have come to an end in 1973 (Van Schaik, 1995). 
8 As the measurement of the dimensions is based on survey questions with limited choice possibilities (e.g. between 
1-10) it is not even possible in practice that the dimensions can take unlimited values. Most probably the practical 
limit is even lower than the theoretical limit as respondents most probably do not choose for the ultimate anchors 
when answering questions. Therefore, a certain ‘decreasing marginal return-effect’ can be expected.   21 
considerably with the current members of the Union in terms of basic cultural values. The earlier 
experiment on value convergence in 4 European regions clearly showed that even within the 
current EU the probability that true value convergence will take place is rather limited, let alone 
if the new member countries are included. On the other hand, it can also be argued that the exact 
goal of the EU was to unite countries that differ considerably in terms of values and in this way 





Economic development is linked with systematic changes in basic values, a thesis also known as 
modernization theory. But cultural change is path dependent. The broad cultural heritage of a 
society leaves an imprint on values despite the process of economic development. Inglehart has 
described  and  empirically  analysed  the  relationship  between  cultural  values  and  economic 
development (1990, 1997, 2000). Inglehart has shown that economic development is linked with 
systematic  changes  in  basic  values.  He  concludes  that  ‘in  marked  contrast  to  the  growing 
materialism  linked  with  the  industrial  revolution,  the  unprecedented  existential  security  of 
advanced industrial society gave rise to an intergenerational shift towards postmaterialist and 
postmodernist  values’  (Inglehart  and  Baker,  2000,  21).  Inglehart’s  main  argument  is  that 
economic  development  has  a  number  of  systematic  and  predictable  cultural  and  political 
consequences (ibid.). We followed Inglehart and argued that cultural change does not follow a 
linear path, but in fact has two dimensions. The first relates to early industrialization and the rise 
of the working class. The second dimension reflects the value changes that are linked to the 
affluent conditions of advanced industrial society and the rise of the service sector. In addition to 
these findings, Inglehart and Baker found evidence for the persistence of distinctive traditional 
values and concluded that cultural change may be path-dependent. 
This former thesis is also known as Inglehart’s thesis. In this paper we have built on his 
thesis and we focused on the explanation of value patterns and differences in values between 
European  regions.  We  concentrated  on  European  regions  as  global  processes  and  European 
integration in specific, have resulted in a revival of the concept of the region in Europe. Regions 
are again featuring political, social and economic life. The process of European integration has   22 
resulted in blurring boundaries of the state and increased regionalism which have resulted in a 
considerable  body  of  work  on  the  so-called  ‘Europe  of  the  regions’,  meaning  that  the  real 
development will take place on the regional and not the national level. The explanation of value 
differences is particularly interesting against the background of a unifying Europe and the utopian 
idea of a ‘Europe of the regions’. The question we tried to answer in this paper is if we can speak 
of  cultural  unification  in  Europe.  After  describing  the  cultural  differences  across  European 
regions  we  made  an  effort  to  explain  these  value  differences.  And  finally,  we  tried  to  say 
something on the possible convergence of values across Europe.  
We have several important findings. First, Inglehart’s thesis on economic development 
and  cultural  heritage  holds  true  for  European  regions.  This  may  not  be  surprising  given  the 
inclusion of European countries in Inglehart’s research, but is nevertheless a confirmation of his 
thesis. Moreover, we found a specific regional effect of protestant heritage. We also found that 
this  specific  effect  of  cultural  heritage  disappeared  when  we  controlled  for  country-specific 
effects.  This  implies  that  Inglehart  and  Baker  are  correct  in  classifying  Germany  and  The 
Netherlands as historically protestant societies. Hence, despite the intra-national differences, our 
results  suggest  that  the  regional  heritage  of  Protestantism  is  reflected  in  country-specific 
characteristics and embedded in national institutions. 
Second, we have shown that on one of the dimensions that describe basic values –  the 
Survival/self-expression dimension – there has been a period-specific effect in the 1990s. We 
suggested that broad societal developments like the New Economy hype, the adoption of the 
single currency in Europe and – perhaps most important - the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
‘the end of history’ (Fukuyama, 1992) may have resulted in an optimistic view on the future and 
may have subsequently resulted in this period-specific effect when explaining value differences 
across European regions in the 1990s. This is an important contribution to the general thesis as 
developed by Inglehart, namely we have not only shown that economic development together 
with cultural heritage is linked with value changes, but also that unique historical shocks can 
have significant effects on value systems. 
Third, we have illustrated that convergence of values – even if we allow for significant 
economic catch-up growth of poorer regions – takes a very long period, if it would occur anyway. 
The vision of the European Commission of a ‘Europe of the Regions’ in which there would be a 
reasonable  homogeneous  regional  social-economic  structure  across  Europe  and  a  shared   23 
European  value  system  is  therefore  not  built  on  realistic  accounts  of  the  actual  cultural 
differences that exist in Europe. Assuming that values are reflected in political arguments, it is 
difficult to come to a strong and broadly shared view on important political issues in Europe, let 
alone if the (future) European enlargement implies that countries are made member that differ 
even more on basic values. Following our line of reasoning, we can expect that the inclusion of 
the middle and eastern European countries in a political institution like the EU will result in a 




Albrechts, L., 1995, Shifts in Europe, in: An enlarged Europe, regions in competition?, Hardy, 
S., Hart, M., Albrechts, L., and A. Katos (ed.), Regional Studies Association, London, p. 22-34. 
 
Bell, D., 1973, The coming of post-industrial society, Basic Books, New York. 
 
Chenery, H.B. 1960.”Patterns of industrial growth.”, American economic review 50:624-654. 
 
Clark, C., 1957[1940], The conditions of economic progress, MacMillan & Co LTD, London. 
 
European Value Studies (EVS): http://www.uvt.nl/evs 
 
Feinstein,  Charles,  1999,  Structural  change  in  the  developed  countries  during  the  twentieth 
century, Oxford review of economic policy 15, 35-55. 
 
Fourastié, J., 1949, Le grand espoir du XX siècle, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris. 
 
Fukuyama, F., 1992, The end of history and the last man, Penguin books, London. 
 
Fukuyama, 1995, Trust: the social virtues and the creation of prosperity, New York, Free Press. 
 
Geertz, C., 1973, The Interpretation of cultures, New York, Basic Books.   24 
 
Hofstede,  G.,  2001,  Culture’s  consequences;  comparing  values,  behaviors,  institutions  and 
organizations across nations. (2
nd ed.) Beverly Hills: Sage publications. 
 
Huntington, S.P., 1996, The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order, New York, 
Simon and Schuster. 
 
Inglehart  ,  R.,  1977,  The  silent  revolution:  changing  values  and  political  styles  in advanced 
industrial societies, Princeton, Princeton University Press. 
 
Inglehart, R., 1990, Culture shift in advanced industrial society. Princeton, Princeton University Press. 
 
Inglehart,  R.,  1997,  Modernization  and  post-modernization,  Princeton,  Princeton  University 
Press. 
 
Inglehart,  R  and  W.E.  Baker.  2000.  “Modernization,  cultural  change,  and  the  persistence  of 
traditional values.” American sociological review 65:19- 51. 
 
Keating, M., 1998, The new regionalism in Western Europe, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK. 
 
Knack  and  Keefer,  1997,  Does  social  capital  have  an  economic  pay-off?  A  cross  country 
investigation, Quarterly journal of economics, vol. 112.4, p. 1251-1288. 
 
Kuznets,  S.,  1971,  Economic  growth  of  nations,  total  output  and  production  structure,  The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts. 
 
Maddison, A., 2001, The world economy: a millennial perspective, OECD, Paris 
 
Newlands, D., The economic role of regional governments in the European Community, in: An 
enlarged Europe, regions in competition?, Hardy, S., Hart, M., Albrechts, L., and A. Katos (ed.), 
Regional Studies Association, London, p. 70-80.   25 
 
Ohmae, K., 1995, The end of the nation state: the rise of regional economies, New York: the Free 
Press. 
 
Piore, M.J., and C. Sabel, 1984, The second industrial divide, possibilities for prosperity, New 
York, Basic Books. 
 
Ploeg, Van de R., 2002, In art we trust, De economist, vol. 150, p. 333-362. 
 
Putnam,  R.;  Leonardi,  R.;  and  Nanetti,  R.Y.  1993.  Making  democracy  work. Princeton,  New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press.  
 
Rostow, WW., 1960, The stages of economic growth: a non-communist manifesto, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Rowthorn,  R.  and  R.  Ramaswamy,  1997,  De-industrialisation:  Causes  and  implications,  IMF 
working paper 97/42. 
 
Rowthorn,  R.  and  R.  Ramaswamy,  1999,  Growth,  trade  and  de-industrialisation,  IMF  Staff 
Papers, vol. 46, p. 18-41. 
 
Schaik, van A.B.T.M, 1995, On the empirics of endogenous economic growth, in: Schoonbeek, 
L., E. Sterken, and S.K. Kuipers (ed.), Methods and applications of economic dynamics, 
Amsterdam, North-Holland, p. 303-331. 
 
Zak, P. and S. Knack, 2001, Trust and growth, The economic journal, 111, p. 295-321.   26 




Traditional values emphasize the following: 
 
·  God is very important in respondent’s life 
·  Respondent has a strong sense of national pride 
·  Respondent favours more respect for authority 
·  Divorce is never justifiable 
·  Respondent almost never discusses political matters 
 





Survival values emphasize the following: 
 
·  Respondent gives priority to economic and physical security over 
self-expression and quality of life 
·  Respondent describes him/her self as not very happy 
·  Respondent describes him/her self as not very satisfied with life 
·  Homosexuality is never justifiable 
·  Respondent’s feel one has to be very careful in trusting people 
   
(Self-expression values emphasize the opposite) 
 
Source: Inglehart and Baker (2000).  
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Table 2: Inglehart’s two basic cultural dimensions in European regions in 1990 and 1999 
Number  Region 
(NUTS- 
code) 































































































































































































































Source: Based on Inglehart and Baker (2000). For the exact calculation of the dimensions and the weights the 
different components have, one can contact the authors. 
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Figure 1: scores of European regions on two cultural dimensions in 1990 
Survival/Self-expression 1990




















































































Figure 2: scores of European regions on two cultural dimensions in 1999 
 
Survival/self-expression 1999
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Table  3:  Regression  results  of  two  cultural  dimensions  on  independent  variables  measuring 






























Gross  Regional 
Product (/1000) 
.015 (.0022)**  .008 (.001)**  .003 (.001)*  .0056 (.001)** 
Historically 
protestant (=1) 
.035 (.017)*  .018 (.033)  .084 (.018)**  -.002 (.016) 
Period-specific effect 
(2nd period (90s)= 1) 
-.011 (-.015)  0.002 (.011)  .032 (.014)*  .024 (.009)** 
Netherlands  -  -.03 (.025)  -  .18 (.015)** 
Spain  -  -.13 (.031)**  -  .002 (.019) 
Portugal  -  -.18 (.048)**  -  -.11 (.018)** 
UK  -  -.15 (.030)**  -  .048 (.016)** 
Belgium  -  -.12 (.027)**  -  -.0009 (.029) 
France  -  -.08 (.027)**  -  -.053 (.015)** 











Note: White corrected standard errors between parentheses; * indicates 5% significance, ** indicates 1% significance.  
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Table 4: Estimated value patterns 
 
Excluding country dummies      Estimated scores on basic values in 2020 
 
        Level of GRP    Traditional/rational  Survival/self- 
per capita 1990        expression 
 
  dimension    dimension 
Rheinland-Pfalz (Germany)  15254      .52 (.41)    .88 (.19) 
Eastern Netherlands    12907      .48 (.28)    .84 (.35) 
Campania, South-Italy  10437      .37 (.06)    .26 (.11) 
Portugal (continent)    9053      .34 (.04)    .26 (.01) 
 
 
Including country dummies       Estimated scores on basic values in 2020 
 
        Level of GRP   Traditional/     Survival/     
per capita 1990   rational    self-expression 
 
  dimension    dimension     
Rheinland-Pfalz (Germany)  15254      0.68 (.41)    0.31 (.19)     
Eastern Netherlands    12907      0.52 (.28)    0.64 (.35) 
Campania, South-Italy  10437      0.21 (.06)    0.20 (.11) 
Portugal (continent)     9053      0.22 (.04)    0.04 (.01) 
 
Note: Calculation of dimensions in 2020 is based on regression results including residual values. True values in 1999 
are shown in parentheses (see also table 2). The 1990 welfare level of each region (GRP per capita) is written in the 
second column. The twenty-year growth period implies  the estimated GRP’s of 2010 are used to calculate  the 
cultural dimensions. 
 
Table 5: growth rate of per capita GDP 1950-1973 and 1973-1998 
1950-1973  1973-1998 
 
Belgium  3.55    1.89 
France   4.05    1.61 
Germany  5.02    1.60 
Italy    4.95    2.07 
Netherlands  3.45    1.76 
Portugal  5.66    2.29 
Spain    5.79    1.97 
UK    2.44    1.79 
Source: taken from Maddison (2001) 
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Table 6: Scores on the cultural dimension for eastern and middle European countries in 1999 
Country  Traditional/rational     Survival/self-expression 
dimension      dimension 
 
Malta    -.145        .098 
Estonia  .299        -.099 
Latvia    .21        -.174 
Lithuania  .21        -.136 
Poland   .032        -.046 
Czech R.  .331        .08 
Slovakia  .20        -.065 
Hungary  .118        -.137 
Romania  .01        -.229 
Bulgaria  .21        -.179 
Slovenia  .259        .0767 
 
 
 